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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

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February [illegible] 1990

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SSCI #90-505

The Honorable James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Secretary Baker:

The Senate Intelligence Committee, as part of the annual budget authorization process, will hold a hearing on U.S. counterintelligence and security programs on May 10, 1990, in Room SH-219 of the Hart Senate Office Building. We request that you make available to testify at that hearing Mr. Ivan Selin, Undersecretary of State for Management. Other witnesses invited to testify are FBI Director William S. Sessions, Mr. Ted Price, the announced successor to Mr. Gardner Hathaway as CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operations and head of the CIA Counterintelligence Center; and Mr. Rich Haver, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

We are asking all witnesses to be prepared to discuss with the Committee the results of the Administration's review of counterintelligence and security programs for the 1990s, whether recent changes in the threat and operating environment require modifying objectives in the 1990s, and the implications for NFIP and non-NFIP resource allocation, program direction, and possible legislation. The hearing will also consider issues identified in testimony from a group of prominent citizens scheduled for March 22, and we will be in touch with you further on those matters.

We would like Mr. Selin to address in his written testimony and be prepared to discuss the following questions: (1) To what extent has political change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe affected their intelligence threat in the 1990s and the requirements for CI operations and security measures against that threat? (2) To what extent do other traditional threats, such as the PRC and Cuba, require greater attention in the 1990s? (3) What are the emerging threats in the 1990s from third world and "friendly" intelligence services, as well as narcotics traffickers and terrorists? (4) What new challenges do technological advances and transfers to criteria countries and terrorist groups pose in the 1990s? (5) What are the consequences of these changing threats for embassy security priorities and protection of diplomatic, military, and intelligence secrets?

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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

February 7, 1990

SSCI #90-507

The Honorable William Sessions
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
J. Edgar Hoover Building
Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Director Sessions:

The Senate Intelligence Committee, as part of the annual budget authorization process, will hold a hearing on U.S. counterintelligence and security programs on May 10, 1990, in Room SH-219 of the Hart Senate Office Building. We invite you to testify at that hearing as FBI Director and as chairman of the DCI's Advisory Group on Counterintelligence. Other witnesses invited to testify are Undersecretary of State Ivan Selin, Mr. Ted Price, the announced successor to Mr. Gardner Hathaway as CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operations and head of the CIA Counterintelligence Center, and Mr. Rich Haver, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. *

We are asking all witnesses to be prepared to discuss with the Committee the results of the Administration's review of counterintelligence and security programs for the 1990s, whether recent changes in the threat and operating environment require modifying objectives in the 1990s, and the implications for NFIP and non-NFIP resource allocation, program direction, and possible legislation. The hearing will also consider issues identified in testimony from a group of prominent citizens scheduled for March 22, and we will be in touch with you further on those matters.

We would like you to address in your written testimony and be prepared to discuss the following questions: (1) What are the results of the Administration's review of counter-intelligence and security programs to meet the needs of the 1990s? (2) How will the Administration coordinate national policy in these areas? (3) What national policy initiatives are required for the 1990s, i.e., personnel security standards, actions to deter leaks? (4) To what extent has political change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe diminished their intelligence threat in the 1990s and the requirements for CI operations and security measures against that threat? (5) To what extent do other traditional threats, such as the PRC and Cuba, require greater attention in the 1990s? (6) What are the emerging threats in the 1990s from third world and "friendly" intelligence services, as well as narcotics traffickers and

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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

February 7, 1990

SSCI #90-506

The Honorable William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Judge Webster:

The Senate Intelligence Committee, as part of the annual budget authorization process, will hold a hearing on U.S. counterintelligence and security programs on May 10, 1990, in Room SH-219 of the Hart Senate Office Building. We request that you make available to testify at that hearing Mr. Ted Price, the announced successor to Mr. Gardner Hathaway as Associate Deputy Director for Operations and head of the CIA Counterintelligence Center. Other witnesses invited to testify are FBI Director William S. Sessions, Undersecretary of State Ivan Selin, and Mr. Rich Haver, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence.

We are asking all witnesses to be prepared to discuss with the Committee the results of the Administration's review of counterintelligence and security programs for the 1990s, whether recent changes in the threat and operating environment require modifying objectives in the 1990s, and the implications for NFIP and non-NFIP resource allocation, program direction, and possible legislation. The hearing will also consider issues identified in testimony from a group of prominent citizens scheduled for March 22, and we will be in touch with you further on those matters. || postpone

We would like Mr. Price to address in his written testimony and be prepared to discuss the following questions: (1) To what extent has political change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe affected their intelligence threat in the 1990s and the requirements for CI operations and security measures against that threat? (2) To what extent do other traditional threats, such as the PRC and Cuba, require greater attention in the 1990s? (3) What are the emerging threats in the 1990s from third world and "friendly" intelligence services, as well as narcotics traffickers and terrorists? (4) What new challenges do technological advances and transfers to criteria countries and terrorist groups pose in the 1990s? (5) What are the consequences of these changing threats for operations and security at CIA stations, embassy security priorities, and protection of military, diplomatic, and intelligence secrets? (6) Are US computer and communications security efforts

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United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
90 FEB 13 AM 11: 29

February 7, 1990

SSCI #90-508

The Honorable Dick Cheney
Secretary of Defense
The Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Secretary Cheney:

The Senate Intelligence Committee, as part of the annual budget authorization process, will hold a hearing on U.S. counterintelligence and security programs on May 10, 1990, in Room SH-219 of the Hart Senate Office Building. We request that you make available to testify at that hearing Mr. Rich Haver, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence. Other witnesses invited to testify at this hearing are FBI Director William S. Sessions, Mr. Ivan Selin, Undersecretary of State for Management, and Mr. Ted Price, the announced successor to Mr. Gardner Hathaway as CIA Associate Deputy Director for Operations and head of the CIA Counterintelligence Center.

We are asking all witnesses to be prepared to discuss with the Committee the results of the Administration's review of counterintelligence and security programs for the 1990s, whether recent changes in the threat and operating environment require modifying objectives in the 1990s, and the implications for NFIP and non-NFIP resource allocation, program direction, and possible legislation. The hearing will also consider issues identified in the testimony from a group of prominent citizens scheduled for March 22, and we will be in touch with you further on those matters.

We would like Mr. Haver to address in his written testimony and be prepared to discuss the following questions: (1) What are the results of his review of DoD counter-intelligence which you stated was "an early and high priority" in your letter of May 31, 1989? (2) To what extent has political change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe diminished their intelligence threat in the 1990s and the requirements for CI operations and security measures against that threat? (3) To what extent do other traditional threats, such as the PRC and Cuba, require greater attention in the 1990s? (4) What are the emerging threats in the 1990s from third world and "friendly" intelligence services, as well as narcotics traffickers and terrorists? (5) What new challenges do technological advances and transfers to criteria countries and terrorist groups pose in the 1990s? (6) What are the consequences of these changing threats for

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ENCLOSURE

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Sec Def Cont Nr. X52444

Memornadum to Director, FBI

12. ISSUE: The Committee believes the FBI does not share all information contain in its files with other members of the intelligence community when asked and that a centralized file would ensure full information is available to all intelligence agencies.

QUESTION: What are the advantages and disadvantages of a single database for CIA, FBI, and DOD?

RECOMMENDATIONS: 1. That the INTD, ASD, CID, and RMD prepare responses for the questions identified above and submit those questions to the Congressional Affairs Office by close of business April 5, 1989 in the format currently in use classified as approriate with a heading for issue, question, summary response, details, and approval signed by the appropriate Assistant Director or Deputy Assistant Director and date signed.

APPROVED:

Director	Adm. Servs.	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.
Exec. AD-Adm.	Crim. Inv.	Off of Lia. & Intl Affs.
Exec. AD-Inv.	Ident.	Rec. Mgmt.
Exec. AD-LES	Inspection	Tech. Servs.
	Intell.	Training
	Laboratory	
	Legal Coun.	

2. That the Congressional Affairs Office coordinate the preparation of briefing materials and prepare the Director's opening statement and briefing book.

APPROVED:

Director	Adm. Servs.	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs.
Exec. AD-Adm.	Crim. Inv.	Off of Lia. & Intl Affs.
Exec. AD-Inv.	Ident.	Rec. Mgmt.
Exec. AD-LES	Inspection	Tech. Servs.
	Intell.	Training
	Laboratory	
	Legal Coun.	

SECRET/SENSITIVE

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6475

#88-3613

October 17, 1988

Honorable William Sessions
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C. 20535

Dear Director Sessions:

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is conducting a comprehensive review of U.S. counterintelligence and security programs and capabilities. Included in this review will be Executive branch efforts to stem the flow of sensitive technology and equipment to foreign governments.

Recent press reporting has alleged that such transfers have been made by the military offices of Egypt and Israel. Accordingly, I request that the FBI brief the Committee staff on any unauthorized transfer of technology and equipment from the United States by the Egyptians and by the Israelis. For the latter, we are particularly interested in any role played in these transfers by the Israeli Defense Procurement Mission and Trade Center in New York.

Sincerely,

David L. Boren
David L. Boren
Chairman

William S. Cohen
William S. Cohen
Vice Chairman

SECRET/SENSITIVE

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MEMORANDUM

Exec AD Adm___
Exec AD Inv___
Exec AD LES___
Asst.Dir.:
Adm.Servs.___
Crim.Inv.___
Ident.___
Insp.___
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Lab.___
Legal Couns.___
Off.Cong & Public Affs.___
OLIA___
Rec. Mgnt.___
Tech. Servs.___
Training___
Telephone Rm.___
Director's Sec'y___

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To : Mr. S. M. McWeeney — Date 4/20/88

From : M. V. Hale

Subject : SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (SSCI) REQUEST TO DISCUSS THE OFFICE OF LIAISON AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (OLIA) AND THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SITUATION IN WEST BERLIN

This communication is classified SECRET.

Reference memorandum captioned as above dated 4/14/88.

PURPOSE:

To set forth results of briefing of John Eliff, Professional Staff, SSCI, conducted by Office of Congressional Public Affairs Supervisory Special Agent John S. Hooks, Jr., Unit Chief Roland O. L'Allier, Jr., Intelligence Division, and OLIA Deputy Chief Martin V. Hale on the issue of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) representation in Berlin.

RECOMMENDATION:

None, for information only.

APPROVED:		
	Adm. Servs. ___	Off. of Cong. & Public Affs. ___
	Crim. Inv. ___	Off. of Lia. & Intl. Affs. MVH
Director ___	Ident. ___	Rec. Mgmt. ___
Exec. AD-Adm. ___	Inspection ___	Tech. Servs. ___
Exec. AD-Inv. ___	Intell. ___	Training ___
Exec. AD-LES ___	Laboratory ___	
	Legal Coun. ___	

(CONTINUED - OVER)

1 - S. M. McWeeney
1 - J. H. Geer
Attn: J. E. Tomlinson
1 - J. K. O'Brien
Attn: J. S. Hooks, Jr.
1 - S. A. Pimentel
1 - T. E. Crosson
1 - M. V. Hale

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MAY 25 1988

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Declassify on: OADR

18 DEC 22 1988

Memorandum from M. V. Hale to Mr. S. M. McWeeney
Re: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) Request to Discuss the Office of Liaison and International Affairs (OLIA) and the Counterintelligence Situation in West Berlin

DETAILS:

Mr. Hale opened the session, advising Mr. Eliff that, on his recent trip to Western Europe to visit certain U. S. Embassies and establishments, including the U. S. Mission in West Berlin, where Legal Attaches were desired and needed, he had conferred with appropriate U. S. military, U. S. Department of State (USDS) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel in order to present the FBI's case for representation in West Berlin. During these discussions, Mr. Hale was advised that staff members of the SSCI had recently visited West Berlin concerning counterintelligence issues and Mr. Hale, in that context, wished to brief Mr. Eliff regarding the FBI's perspectives on opening a Legal Attache, particularly from a counterintelligence point of view.

Mr. Eliff stated that although he had not recently visited West Berlin, he was intimately familiar with the intricacies of the counterintelligence atmosphere in West Berlin and supported the FBI's presence there. He indicated he was well aware of the gap which existed in the counterintelligence coverage of U. S. civilians, both students and businessmen in that neither the U. S. military nor the U. S. civilian intelligence intelligence components were addressing the threat to these individuals and this for two reasons.

The first involved the basic functions of the U. S. intelligence components in West Berlin, a function he described as being the collection of positive intelligence as opposed to counterintelligence, the latter being at best a secondary requirement.

(CONTINUED - OVER)

Memorandum from M. V. Hale to Mr. S. M. McWeeney
Re: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) Request to Discuss the Office of Liaison and International Affairs (OLIA) and the Counterintelligence Situation in West Berlin

DETAILS CONTINUED:

The second reason for this gap involves the legal guidelines under which the U. S. military, by virtue of their authority of an occupying power in West Berlin, conducts technical surveillance and mail openings. Mr. Eliff stated that, as an occupying power, the U. S. military, much like the FBI domestically, is the entity which conducts telephone monitorings of criteria country establishments and personnel in the U. S. sector of West Berlin. It also opens certain mail of interest from the East which passes through this sector. However, whenever there is an overhear of a U. S. national or whenever there is mention made of a U. S. national in a piece of correspondence, that U. S. national's name is not disseminated to any other U. S. intelligence agency. This lack of dissemination is as a result of a lawsuit in the early 1970s against the U. S. Army which, at that time, had in fact been monitoring the activities of U. S. nationals. As a consequence of this lawsuit, very stringent guidelines were written which compelled the U. S. military to use the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to monitor Americans including stringent guidelines for minimizing overhears of U. S. nationals when monitoring non U. S. nationals.

The net results of these restrictions is that, according to Mr. Eliff, 15 years worth of overhears of U. S. nationals as well as the like potential collection of names of U. S. persons via mail openings has been lost.

Mr. Eliff advised it was his belief these minimization restrictions were too stringent and should be amended to allow for dissemination. He however stated that he thought the issue should be brought up after the upcoming elections in that he did not believe a "lame duck" administration would be interested in undertaking the issue.

(CONTINUED - OVER)

Memorandum from M. V. Hale to Mr. S. M. McWeeney
Re: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI)
Request to Discuss the Office of Liaison and
International Affairs (OLIA) and the
Counterintelligence Situation in West Berlin

DETAILS CONTINUED:

As an aside, Mr. Eliff indicated that Allan Kornblum, Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, Department of Justice, had visited West Berlin on two occasions and was conversant with this U. S. military monitoring issue.

Mr. Eliff also stated that he further supported an FBI presence in West Berlin in that his study of the counterintelligence venue in that city indicated to him that the many double agent cases run by the U. S. military there were run for parochial reasons with no strategic view of counterintelligence. He stated that even though the U. S. military services were professional and did coordinate the turnover of some of their many double agents to the FBI when these agents are rotated back to domestic assignment, he believed the FBI should have input at the outset of these double agent cases insofar as the double agent technique was a fundamental counterintelligence tool which demanded consultation with the principle counterintelligence service, the FBI, at their inception in order to better globally address counterintelligence issues.

He stated he believed FBI presence in West Berlin would therefore be necessary if the U. S. were to have a coherent national counterintelligence strategy.

Mr. Eliff concluded by reiterating his support for the FBI's presence in West Berlin, by indicating that he would be willing, were we to ask, to indicate his support of this position to the USDS, the U. S. military and the CIA as well as Mr. Jeff Smith, Chief Staffer for Senator Sam Nunn, the latter also well versed in counterintelligence issues and a potential strong supporter of the FBI's cause.

Messrs L'Allier, Hooks, and Hale thanked Mr. Eliff for his time and indicated that the FBI had designated a new assistant Legal Attache in Bonn whose function would largely be to travel weekly to West Berlin in order to prepare the FBI's case for a permanent presence there.

1} CURRENT FBI RELATIONSHIP WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY {NSA} AND CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY {CIA} COMPONENTS [IN NEW YORK.] THE STAFF MEMBERS HAVE REQUESTED THAT THEY BE GIVEN A TOUR AND BRIEFING AT THE [MEGAHUT] FACILITY. ACCORDING TO SSCI STAFF MEMBER, NSA HAS POSED NO OBJECTIONS, AND INTD HAS NO OBJECTIONS EITHER. HOWEVER, TOUR AND BRIEFING SHOULD BE HANDLED BY THE SUPERVISOR, AND COMMENTARY SHOULD BE GUARDED. UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD TARGETS BE IDENTIFIED, AND NO DISCUSSION SHOULD ENSUE WITH REGARD TO COVERAGE OF OR PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED WITH COVERAGE OF NON-HOSTILE TARGETS. JFK (1)(B) JFK (1)

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FBI AND CIA SHOULD BE CHARACTERIZED AS "EXCELLENT." SSCI STAFFER REQUESTED THAT INVITATION BE EXTENDED TO [NEW YORK CIA FOREIGN RESOURCE DIVISION {FRD}] REPRESENTATIVE TO ATTEND THIS PORTION OF THE DISCUSSIONS. THIS REQUEST HAS BEEN DENIED, AND SSCI STAFFERS HAVE BEEN ASKED TO CONTACT CIA[/FRD] INDEPENDENTLY. JFK (1)(B) JKF (1)(B)

2} UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION BEFORE CONGRESS. SSCI STAFFERS HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN KNOWING VIEWS OF FIELD ON UNDERCOVER OPERATIONS; PROBLEMS, VALUE, ETC.? INTD SUGGESTS DISCUSSION BE CONFINED TO DESCRIBING "SHOPRITE"